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Complex adaptive systems have been the subject of much recent attention. It is by now well-
established that members (‘agents’) tend to self-segregate into opposing groups characterized by
extreme behavior. However, while different social and biological systems manifest different payoffs,
the study of such adaptive systems has mostly been restricted to simple situations in which the
prize-to-fine ratio, R, equals unity. In this Letter we explore the dynamics of evolving populations
with various different values of the ratio R, and demonstrate that extreme behavior is in fact not a
generic feature of adaptive systems. In particular, we show that “confusion” and “indecisiveness”
take over in times of depression, in which case cautious agents perform better than extreme ones.
A problem of central importance in social, biological
and economic sciences is that of an evolving population
in which individual agents adapt their behavior according
to past experience, without direct interaction between
different members. Of particular interest are situations in
which members (usually referred to as ‘agents’) compete
for a limited resource, or to be in a minority (see e.g., [1]
and references therein.) In financial markets for instance,
more buyers than sellers implies higher prices, and it is
therefore better for a trader to be in a minority group of
sellers. Predators foraging for food will do better if they
hunt in areas with fewer competitors. Rush-hour drivers,
facing the choice between two alternative routes, wish to
choose the route containing the minority of traffic [2].
Considerable progress in the theoretical understanding
of such systems has been gained by studying the simple,
yet realistic model of the minority game (MG) [3], and
its evolutionary version (EMG) [1] (see also [4–13] and
references therein). The EMG consists of an odd num-
ber of N agents repeatedly choosing whether to be in
room ‘0’ (e.g., choosing to sell an asset or taking route
A) or in room ‘1’ (e.g., choosing to buy an asset or taking
route B). At the end of each turn, agents belonging to
the smaller group (the minority) are the winners, each of
them gains 1 point (the ‘prize’), while agents belonging
to the majority room lose 1 point (the ‘fine’). The agents
have a common ‘memory’ look-up table, containing the
outcomes ofm recent occurrences (the particular value of
m is of no importance [1]). Faced with a given bit string
of recent m occurrences, each agent chooses the outcome
in the memory with probability p, known as the agent’s
“gene” value (and the opposite alternative with proba-
bility 1 − p). If an agent score falls below some value d,
then its strategy (i.e., its gene value) is modified. In other
words, each agent tries to learn from his past mistakes,
and to adjust his strategy in order to survive.
A remarkable conclusion deduced from the EMG [1]
is that, a population of competing agents tends to self-
segregate into opposing groups characterized by extreme
behavior. It was realized that in order to flourish in such
situations, an agent should behave in an extreme way
(p = 0 or p = 1) [1].
It should be emphasized, however, that previous anal-
yses were restricted to the simple case in which the prize-
to-fine ratio, R, was assumed to be equal unity. On the
other hand, in many real life situations this ratio may
take a variety of different values. In the extreme situa-
tion, the fine (e.g., a temporary worker getting fired of
work after being late to the office due to a traffic jam,
or a predator being starved to death while unsuccessfully
trying to hunt in an area with many competitors) may
be larger than the prize (a day’s payment or a successful
hunt which guarantees food for few days, respectively).
Another example is that of a trader in a financial mar-
ket which is under depression. In such circumstances,
the trader usually lose more money in a bad deal than he
gains in a successful one (due to overall reduction in mar-
ket’s value). In addition, in many cases there are taxes
on profits, implying a reduction in the value of R.
Moreover, we know from real life situations that ex-
treme agents not always perform better than cautious
ones. In particular, our daily experience indicates that
in difficult situations (e.g., when the prize-to-fine ratio is
low) human people tend to be confused and indecisive.
In fact, in such circumstances they usually seek to do the
same (rather than the opposite) as the majority.
Thus, of great interest for real social and biological
systems are situations in which the prize-to-fine ratio is
smaller (or larger) than unity. The aim of the present
Letter is to explore the dynamics of evolving populations
with various different external conditions (i.e., different
values of the ratio R). Of main importance is the identi-
fication of the strategies that perform best in a particular
situation.
Figure 1 displays the long-time frequency distribution
P (p) of the agents (the lifespan, L(p), defined as the aver-
age length of time a strategy p survives between modifica-
tions, has a similar behavior). We find three qualitatively
different populations, depending on the precise value of
the prize-to-fine ratio parameter, R. For R > R
(1)
c (this
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includes the case studied so far in the literature, R = 1.
The value of R
(1)
c depends on the number of agents and
the parameter d) the distribution becomes peaked around
p = 0 and p = 1 – the population will self-segregate
(this corresponds to always or never following what hap-
pened last time). To flourish in such a population, an
agent should behave in an extreme way [1]. On the other
hand, for R < R
(2)
c (poor conditions, in which the fine
is larger than the reward) the population tends to crowd
around p = 12 . This corresponds to “confused” and “in-
decisive” agents. There is also an intermediate phase [for
R
(2)
c < R < R
(1)
c ], in which the population tends to form
an M-shaped distribution, peaked around some finite p0
and its counterpart 1− p0 (with the absolute minimas of
the distribution located at p = 0 and p = 1).
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FIG. 1. The strategy distribution P (p) for different values
of the prize-to-fine ratio: R = 0.971, R = 0.992, and R = 1.
The results are for N = 10001 agents, d = −4. Each point
represents an average value over 10 runs and 100000 time
steps per run.
An important feature of the original EMG (for the R =
1 case [1]) is that the root-mean-square (rms) separation
of the strategies is higher than the corresponding value
for uniform P (p). This indicates the desire of agents to do
the opposite of the majority [1]. Figure 2 shows the rms
separation of the population as a function of the prize-to-
fine ratio, R. Remarkably, we find that for small values
of R the rms is in fact smaller than that obtained for a
uniform P (p) distribution. We therefore conclude that in
times of difficulties agents desire to do the same (rather
than the opposite) as the majority. This is exactly the
type of behavior we anticipated in the introduction based
on daily experience.
In the original EMG [1] it was found that the dynam-
ics of the system leads to situations in which the size
of the minority group is maximized, indicating that the
efficiency of the system is maximized. The (scaled) effi-
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FIG. 2. The root-mean-square separation (rms) of the
strategies as a function of the prize-to-fine ratio, R. Hori-
zontal line represents the rms separation for a uniform P (p)
distribution. N = 1001, d = −4. Each point represents an
average value over 10 runs and 10000 time steps per run.
ciency of the system is defined as the number of agents
in the minority room, divided by the maximal possible
size of the minority group, (N − 1)/2. Figure 3 displays
the system’s efficiency as a function of the ratio R. We
also display the efficiency for agents guessing randomly
between room ‘0’ and room ‘1’, and for a uniform distri-
bution of agents. As previously found, there is a range
of R (which includes the previously studied case, R = 1
[1]) in which the efficiency of the system is better than
the random case. However, for small values of the prize-
to-fine ratio, the efficiency of the system is remarkably
lower than that obtained for agents choosing via inde-
pendent coin-tosses. Thus, considering the efficiency of
the system as a whole, the agents would be better off not
adapting their strategies because they are doing worse
than just guessing at random.
Note that an optimum utilization of the resources is
obtained at some Rmax > 1 (with Rmax − 1 ≪ 1). This
implies that an evolving population requires a small pos-
itive feedback in order to exploit its resources in an op-
timal way. On the other hand, a wealthy society has
an efficiency which is worse than that of a uniform P (p)
distribution (this occurs for prize-to-fine ratios which are
too large). This reflects the fact that in a “spoiling” en-
vironment, the agents has no real motivation to evolve
(they have a long lifespan even without exploiting their
resources in an optimal way).
In previous studies (of the R = 1 case) it has been
established that the evolving population enters into a
stationary phase, in which case the P (p) distribution re-
mains essentially constant in time [7,4]. In Figure 4 we
display the time-dependence of the average gene value,
<p>, for different values of the prize-to-fine ratio, R. The
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FIG. 3. The (scaled) efficiency E of the system as a func-
tion of the prize-to-fine ratio, R. Horizontal lines represents
the efficiency for uniform P (p) distribution (dashed) and a
coin-tossing situation (dashed-dotted). The parameters are
the same as in Fig. 2.
distribution P (p) oscillates around p = 12 . The smaller
is the value of R the larger are the amplitude and the
frequency of the oscillations. Thus, we conclude that a
population which evolves in a tough environment never
establishes a steady state distribution. Agents are con-
stantly changing their strategies, trying to survive. By
doing so they create global currents in the gene space.
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FIG. 4. Time evolution of the average gene-value, <p>, for
different values of the prize-to-fine ratio: R = 0.9 and R = 1.
The parameters are the same as in Fig. 1.
We now provide some analytical analysis of the prob-
lem, a generalization of the one presented in [1] for ar-
bitrary values of the prize-to-fine ratio, R. The simplest
example of our system contains N = 3 agents, and three
discrete gene values p = 0, 12 , 1. We consider configura-
TABLE I. Distribution of strategies and efficiency of a
three agents system.
R P (0) : P ( 1
2
) efficiency
R < 2 19R−53
26R−58
57R−150
64R−164
2 ≤ R ≤ 3 2.5 1
R > 3 23R−49
23R−61
85R−191
92R−212
tions for which the average gene value lies between 13 and
2
3 , a reminiscent of the fact that <p> displays only mild
oscillations around p = 12 . To obtain the average P (p)
distribution we weight the various configurations accord-
ing to the average points awarded per agent in each of
the configuration [14]. The analytical results are given
in Table I [Note that P (0) = P (1).] We find that this
simplified toy-model provides a fairly good qualitative de-
scription of the complex system. In particular, it follows
that the population self-segregates for prize-to-fine ratios
larger than Rc =
5
7 , while for R < Rc the agents tend to
cluster around p = 12 . In addition, the efficiency of the
system is maximal at intermediate values of the prize-
to-fine ratio, while poor (R < 2) and wealthy (R > 3)
populations display a lower efficiency.
In summary, we have explored the evolution of complex
adaptive systems with an arbitrary value of the prize-to-
fine ratio, R. The main results and their implications are
as follows:
(1) It has been widely accepted that self-segregation
is a generic characteristic of an evolving population of
competing agents. This belief was based on studies of
the R = 1 case. Our analysis, however, turns over this
point of view. In particular, in times of difficulties agents
tend to cluster around p = 12 – cautious agents perform
better (live longer) than extreme ones. Stated in a more
pictorial way, confusion and indecisiveness take over at
tough times.
(2) In previous analyses it was found that agents desire
to do the opposite of the majority [1]. We have shown
that this property is in fact not a generic one. In particu-
lar, in a tough environment agents try to do the same as
the majority [The rms separation of strategies is in fact
smaller than that obtained for a uniform P (p) distribu-
tion.]
(3) For small values of the prize-to-fine ratio (poor
external conditions) the efficiency of the system is well
below the efficiency achieved by random agents (ones
who choose via independent coin-tosses). It seems that
“panic” and “confusion” (clustering around p = 12 ) pre-
vent the agents from achieving a reasonable utilization
of resources. Similarly, a wealthy population, for which
there is no real motivation for adaptation, displays a poor
efficiency. On the other hand, an evolving population
achieves an optimum utilization of its resources when it
receives a (small) positive external reinforcement (that
is, for 0 < Rmax − 1≪ 1).
3
(4) The gene-distribution, P (p), displays temporal-
oscillations around p = 12 . The smaller is the value of
the prize-to-fine ratio, the farther is the system from a
steady-state distribution. This in particular implies that
the steady-state assumption used to analyze the EMG (in
the R = 1 case) [7] is no longer valid for smaller values
of R.
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